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ABSTRACT
Since 1991, China has implemented two significant tax reforms. The first reform, 
in 1994, was a large-scale adjustment of the tax distribution system between the 
central and local governments, and the second reform, in 2012, replaced business 
tax with value-added tax. Also, the size of China’s underground economy decreased 
from 13.55% in 1995 to 12.30% in 2016. The paper presents an evaluation of the effect 
of the two tax reforms and the existing underground economy on GDP growth in 
China. GDP is defined as explained variable, the explanatory variables include: the 
ratio of declared income to actual income, the change of concealed income, and the 
influence of tax rate change on declared income and concealed income. According 
to the tax reform in 1994 and 2012, two dummy variables are set respectively. In 
methodology, this paper uses Simultaneous equations model, SUR-OLSs and Slutsky 
identity. Our estimation is based on the official statistics of China National Bureau 
of Statistics in the period from 1991 to 2019. In empirical analysis, we decomposed 
tax changes into tax rate effect (change of budget constraint slope) and income effect 
(change of tax liability), then analyzed the impact of tax elasticity on GDP growth. 
The empirical results demonstrate that both the 1994 tax reform and 2012 tax reform 
have had a positive impact on GDP, with high statistical significance respectively. 
The results also confirm that the increase of tax rate leads to the increase of hidden 
income, which eventually leads to the decrease of GDP. The offered methodology can 
also be applied to most countries for time series analyses. 
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АННОТАЦИЯ
За период с 1991 г. в Китае были проведены две важные налоговые реформы. 
Первая реформа, проведенная в 1994 г. существенно изменила систему рас-
пределения налогов между центральным и местными уровнями власти. В ходе 
второй налоговой реформы, проведенной в 2012 г., налог на добавленную сто-
имость введен вместо налога на бизнес. В рассатриваемый период, размер тене-
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вой экономики Китая сократился с 13,55% в 1995 г. до 12,30% в 2016 г. В данной 
статье представлена оценка влияния двух налоговых реформ и теневой эконо-
мики на рост ВВП в Китае. ВВП является зависимой переменной, к независимым 
переменным относятся: отношение декларированного дохода к фактическому 
доходу, изменение скрытого дохода, а также влияние изменения налоговой 
ставки на декларированный доход и скрытый доход. Налоговые реформы 1994 
и 2012 гг. введены в модель как две фиктивные переменные. В качестве мето-
дологии исследования использованы модель одновременных уравнений, SUR-
OLS и идентичность Слуцкого. Оценки основаны на официальной статистике 
Национального статистического бюро Китая за период с 1991 по 2019 г. В ходе 
эмпирического анализа была проведена декомпозиция влияния изменения 
налогов на эффект налоговой ставки (изменение наклона бюджетного огра-
ничения) и эффект дохода (изменение налоговых обязательств), а затем было 
проанализировано влияние эластичности налога на рост ВВП. Эмпирические 
результаты с высокой статистической значимостью показали, что и налоговая 
реформа 1994 г., и налоговая реформа 2012 г. оказали положительное влияние 
на ВВП. Результаты исследования также подтверждают, что повышение нало-
говой ставки ведет к росту сокрытых доходов, что в конечном итоге приводит 
к снижению ВВП. Предложенная методология может также быть использована 
для анализа временных рядов в других странах. 
КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА
теневая экономика; уклонение от уплаты налогов; коэффициент внесения на-
личных денег; эластичность налогооблагаемого дохода; спрос на валюту; ва-
лютная операция
1. Introduction
Tax system provides many incen-
tives for people to change their taxation 
behavior, which means that people may 
decide not to declare part or all of their 
income and evade some taxes. However, 
the avoidance fees can be actual resource 
costs (e.g., requiring lawyers or accoun-
tants to help people evade taxes or open 
Swiss bank accounts to cover up income). 
Moreover, it may be that tax evaders know 
that they may go to prison and lead to the 
reduction of personal utility, or the tax 
evaders may be morally condemned be-
cause they know that they have not com-
plied with the legal obligations, resulting 
in the reduction of personal utility. The 
research from Mirus and Smith [1] define 
the underground economy as unreported 
rental incomes, skimming by owners of 
businesses, barter activities, off-the-books 
employment, and unreported income 
from home-produced goods. Indeed, it is 
difficult to accurately measure the size of 
the underground economy, because the 
conspiracy of tax evaders is not easily de-
tected. For example, Kolm and Nielsen [2] 
find that employers and employees may 
agree to underreport business income in 
exchange for employees paying less per-
sonal income tax (PIT). 
Nevertheless, a survey from Buehn 
and Schneider [3] estimate that the pro-
portion of South Korea’s underground 
economy in GDP decreased from 28.3% in 
1999 to 24.7% in 2010, which is related to 
the rapid growth of e-payment in South 
Korea during the past 20 years, resul-
ting in the slowdown of underground 
economy. A research from Dreher and 
Schneider [4] point out that in low-income 
countries, the efficiency of public goods 
provided by the government is lower 
than that in high-income countries, which 
is one of the reasons that drives indivi- 
duals or manufacturers to engage in un-
derground economic activities. Consider-
ing that literature on China’s underground 
economic assessment, Schneider [5] shows 
that China’s underground economy ac-
counted for 13.1, 14.4 and 15.6% of GDP 
in 1999, 2001 and 2002, respectively. Me-
dina and Schneider [6] demonstrate that 
over the period 1991–2015, China’s sha-
dow economy accounts for a minimum 
of 8.3 and a maximum of 14.1 of GDP. Be-
sides that, Chen et al. [7] use the MIMIC 
method for measuring the size of China’s 
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underground economy from 1995 to 2016, 
revealing the average size of the UE in-
creased from 13.55% in 1995 to 14.39% in 
2009, and then fell to 12.30% in 2016. 
2. Background
The reform of China’s tax sharing sys-
tem in 1994 was initiated by the Chinese 
government in 1992 and finally imple-
mented in 1994. As one can see, before 
China’s fiscal and tax reform in 1994, the 
central government discussed with local 
governments over the share of locally col-
lected taxes that would be paid into the 
central budget. This reform is a large-scale 
adjustment of tax distribution system and 
tax structure between central and local 
governments. The main purpose of tax 
sharing reform is to reduce China’s bud-
get deficit since the end of 1980s. There-
fore, tax sharing reform is regarded as 
the key tax reform. On the other hand, 
since 2012, Shanghai has carried out pi-
lot projects to replace business tax with 
value-added tax, including transportation 
industry and some modern service indus-
tries. Furthermore, By 2016, China has 
fully implemented value-added tax (VAT) 
instead of business tax. 
In order to evaluate the impact of 
these two key tax reforms on economic 
growth, this paper takes these two tax re-
forms into the model as dummy variables.
The rest of this paper is arranged as 
follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the rele-
vant theoretical and empirical literature. 
Section 3, we demonstrate the research de-
sign and methodology. This paper reports 
the construction of SUR-OLS regression 
diagnosis using ETI and Slutsky equation. 
In Section 4 and section 5, we check the 
key parameters of the model by SUR-OLS 
regression, which provides a explicit ex-
planation for our findings. A brief conclu-
sion is discussed in Section 6.
3. Review of literature
3.1. Theoretical literature review
In the 1950s, Lewis [8], Kaldor [9] and 
Cagan [10] mark the beginnings of pre-
liminary research into hidden economic 
activities. Since then, more and more 
literatures have focused on the analyses 
between undeclared income and tax ero-
sion. Considering the formal economic 
theory of tax evasion can be traced back to 
Allingham & Sandmo [11]. It is worth no-
ting that Gutmann [12] proposes that re-
cessive economy is not included in the cal-
culation of the gross national product, he 
adopts the ratio of money and deposit to 
estimate the underground economy of the 
United States and illustrates currency and 
demand deposits as the core indicators of 
changes in the size of the underground 
economy (see also Bodemann et al. [13]). 
In this paper, we first review some 
theories about the tax elasticity and un-
derground economy. According to the 
quantitative theory of money, Feige [14] 
demonstrates that the relationship be-
tween the volume of transactions and 
official GDP is constant over time, he 
uses the value of total transactions as an 
estimate of nominal GNP and measures 
the informal economy as the difference 
between nominal GNP and the official 
GNP, proving that reducing income tax 
elasticity means that with the growth of 
GDP, income will not be converted into 
the expected tax base. In addition, Hut-
ton & Lambert [15] derived tax elasticity 
and applied it to UK data to replace exis-
ting estimation techniques. In their view, 
in addition to the total tax data, all that 
needs to be done is to classify taxpay-
ers according to the highest marginal tax 
rate. Obviously, compared with other me-
thods is advantage is that it does not need 
to collect real information about personal 
income. In terms of the theory or concept 
between underground economy and eco-
nomic growth, Adam & Ginsburgh [16] 
pointed out that the relationship between 
the growth of underground economy and 
the official economy is positive.
In addition, La Porta & Shleifer [17] 
claim that economic growth mainly comes 
from the contribution of efficient legal en-
terprises above the ground, rather than 
from the inefficient private enterprises un-
derground. However, Schneider & Enste 
[18] show that two thirds of the income 
from underground economic activities 
will eventually flow into the official eco-
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nomic sector through consumption and 
investment, which will have a positive im-
pact on the official economy.
While research into the elasticity of 
taxable income (ETI), which measures the 
responsiveness of reported taxable income 
to changes in tax rates, dates back to at 
least Lindsey [19]. The ETI can capture this 
wide array of behavioral responses and 
can then be used to calculate both the ef-
ficiency and revenue implications from a 
change in tax rates. The intuition behind 
the standard ETI model is that individuals 
increase taxable wages until its marginal 
cost equals the tax rate (Feldstein [20]). 
Brewer et al. [21] define ETI as “percentage 
change in taxable income” relative to “per-
centage change in net income” (Carroll & 
Hrung [22]). Similarly, Saez et al. [23] em-
phasized the fact that ETI is not a constant 
parameter, but will be affected by govern-
ment policies. In other words, since the pa-
rameters of these models are not structural, 
that is, they are not invariable policies, they 
will inevitably change whenever policies 
change. Therefore, adhering to the policy 
conclusions of these models may lead to 
deviation. Apparent-ly, in a more general 
model, Laffer [24] concerns that changes 
in tax rates have two effects on income, 
including the arithmetic and economic 
effects. The arithmetic effect is that if the 
government reduces the tax rate, tax reve-
nues will be lowered by the amount of the 
decrease in the rate. Conversely, the eco-
nomic effect involves the impact of lower 
tax rates on employment and investment, 
so as to stimulate people to increase these 
activities. Therefore, the combined effects 
of economic and arithmetic effects of tax 
rate changes lead to the uncertainty of the 
impact of tax rate changes on total tax.
3.2. Empirical literature review
The primary methodological objective 
in the empirical literature is to devise a 
method for separating the response of ta-
xable income to changes in tax rates from 
responses to the many other factors that 
also affect taxable income. Especially re-
ferring to the elasticity of taxable income 
(ETI) takes place in a changing economic 
environment, and the changes to that en-
vironment affect income growth. There-
fore, adequately controlling for those non- 
tax-induced trends in taxable income po-
ses a major challenge to estimating elasti-
cities. Feldstein [25] uses panel data to as-
sess taxpayers’ behavioral response to the 
1986 US income tax reform. He estimates 
that the ETI is large, ranging from 1–3. Af-
ter Feldstein [20; 25], the literature on ETI 
has increased greatly. Many subsequent 
researches focus on improving the elasti-
city estimation by paying more attention 
to the net-of-tax rate instrument and non-
tax-related changes in the income distri-
bution. It is worth noting that along with 
these modifications, the ETI estimates de-
creased markedly compared with those 
in Feldstein [25]. Research conducted by 
Gruber & Saez [26] report an ETI of 0.2 for 
middle-income earners and 0.6 for high-
income earners in the US. 
On the other side, Blomquist & Selin 
[27] estimate an ETI of around 0.20 for 
males and 1 for females in Sweden, this 
study focuses directly on the response of 
hourly wage rate to the change of mar-
ginal tax rate, however the model can 
not distinguish effort response from the 
change of compensation form, that is, how 
to distinguish the transformation of fringe 
benefits into full cash payment. Study by 
Matikka [28] shows that the average the 
elasticity of taxable income (ETI) estimate 
in Finland is 0.35–0.60. Earlier literature 
has shown that the income impact is either 
insignificant or small (see Saez, Slemrod & 
Giertz [23]). Hence, Matikka [28] assumes 
that income impact is not considered, but it 
is not easy to observe the income response 
to tax rate changes. Likewise the research 
results from Thoresen & Vattø (2015) [29] 
demonstrate elasticities below 0.1 for Nor-
way. It is worth noting that Creedy (2009) 
[30] considers there is no reason to expect 
the elasticity to remain unchanged over 
time, or to be similar across countries ha-
ving different tax structures and regula-
tions (see also Giertz [31]).
 Further, Creedy & Gemmell [32] pro-
vide estimates of individual and aggregate 
revenue elasticities of income and con-
sumption taxes in the UK over the period 
1989–2000. They find income tax revenue 
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elasticity estimates, of around 1.3 to 1.4 
in the early 1990s, are lower than middle 
1980s, reflecting in part flattening of the 
income tax structure since the time, which 
reveals that discretionary tax changes 
have considerably reduced tax revenues. 
Other countries, Pirttila & Uusitalo [33] 
measure the ETI in Finland, their tenta-
tive analysis shows that the average ETI 
is around 0.3. Mattos & Terra [34] estimate 
ETI in Brazil, which were derived through 
the use of pooled cross-sectional data with 
the difference-in-differences approach, 
the result declares cash transfers seem to 
have a negative association with reported 
income elasticity close to −0.05, suggesting 
that leisure and cash transfers are comple-
ments, whereas in-kind transfers have a 
positive association elasticity coefficient 
close to 0.05, illustrating that they serve 
as leisure substitutes, the study found that 
physical (cash) transfer is positively cor-
related (negatively correlated) with the 
“declared taxable income”. However, for 
most countries, it is not easy to obtain the 
complete and accurate time series data of 
the above two items. 
4. Research Design
4.1. Methodology
As mentioned earlier in the above sec-
tions, our research is arranged and follows 
the processes in associative quantitative re-
search, starting from the determination of 
research topics, discussing historical back-
ground, conducting literature reviews, put-
ting forward theoretical model to formulate 
several testable propositions. Furthermore, 
we define research variab-les and explain 
the source of empirical data on the under-
ground economy (UE), elasticity of taxable 
income (ETI) and tax system issue in China 
since 1991 to discuss about their impact on 
GDP growth. Finally, we implement em-
pirical testing and draw conclusions based 
on the results of the empirical analysis. 
Referring to the important literature 
on underground economy and tax base 
erosion in recent years. Different from 
the analysis of the existing literature, this 
article uses the following methods to in-
vestigate the impact of shadow economy 
on GDP in current social science research. 
We uses Simultaneous equations model, 
Slutsky identity and SUR-OLS approach 
(see Zellner [35]; Griffiths et al. [36]) to 
directly derive income compensation 
elasticity coefficient and income effect 
coefficient. In general, the SUR-OLS esti-
mates are consistently better than the OLS 
(equation-by-equation) estimates, since 
the SUR-OLS method estimates the pa-
rameters of all equations simultaneously, 
so that the parameters of each single equa-
tion also take the information provided by 
the other equations into account. This re-
sults in greater efficiency of the parameter 
estimates (Cadavez & Henningsen [37]). 
Also, the SUR-OLS estimator takes the 
correlation between the error terms into 
account, therefore, SUR-OLS is a robust 
methodology for predicting. As is well 
known, although China’s inland provin-
ces have convenient transportation links. 
Taxpayers are in the same environment 
of tax laws and regulations. Therefore, it 
has the heterogeneity of variance, and the 
residual has the characteristics of contem-
poraneous correlation. In view of this, in 
order to reduce the standard error, this 
paper uses “seemingly unrelated regres-
sion” (SUR-OLS) to test and analyze. 
Also, Slutsky equation has two parts: 
substitution effect and income effect. Ge-
nerally, the substitution effect is negative. 
A merit of this approach used here is that 
the elastic estimation can be calculated 
directly from our model. In addition, in 
order to measure the size of China’s un-
derground economy. In this paper, we use 
the cash deposit ratio (CDR) hypothesis, 
currency demand (CD) hypothesis and 
currency transaction (CT) hypothesis.
Without loss of generality , in this pa-
per, our research is designed and follows 
the processes in associative quantitative 
research, starting from determining prob-
lems, formulating objectives, conducting 
literature reviews, both theoretical and 
empirical approach, formulating research 
hypotheses, define research variables, de-
termine data collection methods, imple-
ment empirical testing and draw conclu-
sions based on the results of the empirical 
analysis. 
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As is well known, simultaneous equa-
tions models are a type of statistical model 
in which the dependent variables are 
functions of other dependent variables, 
rather than just independent variables 
(Martin et al. [38]), which means that some 
of the explanatory variables are jointly de-
termined with the dependent variable. In 
economic society, this is usually the result 
of some potential equilibrium mechanism. 
Nevertheless, simultaneity poses 
challenges for the estimation of the sta-
tistical parameters of interest, because 
the Gauss–Markov assumption of strict 
exogeneity of the regressors is violated, 
whilst it would be natural to estimate 
all simultaneous equations at once, this 
often leads to a computationally costly 
non-linear optimization problem even for 
the simplest system of linear equations 
(Quandt [39]). As is well known , Use of 
SEM is commonly justified in the social 
sciences because of its ability to impute 
relationships between unobserved con-
structs and observable variables (Han-
cock [40]). SEM invokes a measurement 
model that defines latent variables using 
one or more observed variables, the links 
between constructs of a structural equa-
tion model can be estimated with inde-
pendent regression equations(see Kaplan 
[41]). That is, SEM involves sequential de-
cision-making under uncertainty or stra-
tegic environments where beliefs about 
other agents’ actions matter. 
According to the literature review 
of taxable income elasticity (ETI) theory, 
whether from an efficiency or tax perspec-
tive, taxable income elasticity (ETI) is a key 
parameter in revenue analysis. Moreover, 
in recent years, the extended version of 
the ETI- the behavioral elasticity of taxable 
revenue (BETR) has taken over the field of 
public economics and be used to analyze 
the tax base and tax administrative and 
compliance choices, Hemel & Weisbach 
[42] demonstrates the government has to 
pay for audit fees, which reduces resourc-
es. Finally, the government may recover 
tax evasion from the audit-the mechani-
cal revenue effect, on the whole, they are 
just transfers and do not affect the total 
resources. 
However, how the above important 
variables play an important role in the 
decision-making of tax evaders is worth 
studying. In this article, we seek to estab-
lish the framework of the research con-
cept and show the resulting measure – the 
joint elasticity of taxable revenue (JETR) to 
capture the change in GDP caused by any 
marginal change in tax rates, the tax base, 
and tax enforcement. Following the pre-
vious literature, Gruber & Saez [26] shows 
there are two sources of difference here, 
the first is mechanical; broad income has a 
larger base, so that a given dollar response 
will result in a smaller 10 elasticity, the se-
cond is behavioral; taxable income includes 
itemized deductions, which might respond 
to changes in taxes. Following the same 
discussion, Doerrenberg et al. [43] exploit 
several tax reforms that were implemented 
in Germany between 2001 and 2008, the es-
timates show that the total ETI is between 
0.54 and 0.68, and the total income elasti-
city (EGI) is between 0.16 and 0.28. They 
believe that the difference between ETI 
and EGI is caused by the change of tax rate 
caused by the deduction amount. Since the 
deduction amount of China’s official statis-
tics is not available for the time being, this 
paper will not discuss the impact of the de-
duction on economic growth. 
4.2. Model
Before proceeding further, regarding 
the effects that underground economic 
activity has on tax base erosion and the 
maximization of individual utility. We 
start by performing a simplicial model as-
suming that the representative taxpayer 
with a linear utility function of the follo- 
wing properties for above ground econ-
omy income yg and underground econ-
omy income yu, the total real income 
Σy = yg + yu. As is known, linear utilities 
functions are a small subset of quasilinear 
utility functions, where above ground 
economy income and underground econ-
omy income with linear utilities are a spe-
cial case of substitute goods, in which the 
preferences are strictly monotone and 
weakly convex, and the marginal rate of 
substitution of yg and yu is constant. In this 
section, our models accord with the ap-
Journal of Tax Reform. 2021;7(1):87–107
93
ISSN 2412-8872
proach of random utility maximization 
models (RUM) and additive in income. In 
the other words, the systematic utility is 
fixed and the individual choices are static 
(see McFadden [44]).
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In the above formula, a represents 
the coefficient value of the ratio of “above 
ground income” to “actual income” of the 
representative taxpayers, b is the coeffi-
cient value of the ratio of “underground 
income” to “actual income” of the repre-
sentative taxpayers, and 0 < a , 0 < b, agy  de-
notes the representative taxpayer’s above 
ground income, and buy  denotes the repre-
sentative taxpayer’s underground income.
Clearly,it can be seen from the above for-
mula, if the determinant det(A) is posi-
tive, it means that there exists an extreme 
value, where Uygyg < 0, which denotes that 
there exists a relative maximum. Moreo-
ver, Uyuyu < 0, ensuring the consistency 
of concavity. Eq.(4) shows that Uygyu < 0. 
In essence, tax evaders should transfer a 
dollar from ground economy yg to under-
ground economy yu at an concealed cost 
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4.3. An application: decomposing 
the composition effects
Next we exploit Gutmann_UE [12] 
approach combined with National Bureau 
of Statistics of China and China Statistical 
Yearbook to check the changes of China’s 
underground economy over the period 
1991–2019. The CDR method of Gutmann 
[12] implies that: (1) all the UE activities 
are completed in the form of cash trans-
actions; (2) the ratio of cash to deposits 
demand held in the above-ground eco-
nomic activities at any time should be the 
same as the base period; (3) the velocity 
of money circulation of the above ground 
economy is the same as that of the under-
ground economy.
However, Pickhardt & Sardà [45] thinks 
that the ratio of cash to deposits demand 
cannot be fixed in the long term, so two hy-
potheses are added to Gutmann’s original 
hypothesis: (1) in the above ground econo-
mic activities, the currency held by the peo-
ple remains unchanged; (2) the economic 
activities of all additional legal transactions 
are completed through demand deposits.
In contrast with Pickhardt & Sardà 
[45], Gutmann [12] thinks that cash may 
also be used in the above ground eco-
nomic transactions. Based on the above 
viewpoints, this paper estimates the ratio 
of China’s “underground economy” to 
“above ground economy” based on 2017, 
the reason for choosing 2017 as the base 
period include: 
1) as we calculate the size of China’s 
underground economy from 1991 to 2019, 
the ratio of “cash transaction” to “deposit 
currency” is the lowest in 2017, which is 
0.1493. As is known,bank deposit include: 
(a) deposits demand, (b) fixed deposits, 
(c) savings deposits, (d) other deposits. 
2) according to the data of China Na-
tional Burean of Statistics, China’s cash 
account in 2017 is 7,064 billion yuan, M1 
is 54,379 billion yuan, the tax-free cash 
account is 7,175 billion yuan. The cash 
circulated in the underground activity is 
110 billion yuan, M1 deducted the cash 
circulated in the underground activity is 
54,268 billion yuan, demonstrating the 
amount of cash required by the formal 
market. The ratio of “cash circulated in 
the underground market” to “cash circu-
lated in ground market” is 0.00203, which 
is lowest during the period of 1991–2019.
Based on the results of data analy-
sis, we show the ratio of “underground 
economic income” to “above ground eco-
nomic income” is 0.27 for China in 1991, 
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and that ratio in 2019 is 0.004. In compa-
ring with the changing trend of the ratio 
of “underground economic income” to 
“above ground economic income” in 1991 
and 2019, we show that China’s under-
ground economy has ameliorated signifi-
cantly during the past 20 years (see also 
Schneider et al. [46]; Elgin & Öztunali [47]). 
Note that ETI is a measure of how taxable 
income changes when we make a change to 
the tax system, that statistic, moreover, can 
be summarized by a single “sufficient” sta-
tistic: the elasticity of ta-xable income. (see 
Feldstein, 1995 [25]). As is well known, in 
a progressive income tax rate schedule, the 
marginal tax rate increases as taxable in-
come increases. Hence, a change in taxable 
income endo-genously defines the change 
in the net-of-tax rate, and thus a valid in-
strumental variable for (1 − m) is required 
(Saez et al. [23], Matikka [28]). 
Considering the joint role of the 
elasticity of taxable income (the effect 
on taxable income of a tax rise) and the 
revenue elasticity (the effect on revenue 
of a change in taxable income) in influen- 
cing the revenue effects of tax rate chan-
ges and GDP. In Eq. (7), we illustrate the 
correlation between aggregate income, 
the elasticity of taxable income and the 
revenue elasticity as follows:
;
(1 )
Z Y HdY dm dR dR
m R R
−∂ ∂ ∂= + −












In this case, we further describe this 
expression as follows:
(1 )
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(7)
Using the Slutsky compensation equa-
tion approach, we get 
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(9)
which can be rewritten as 
(1 )
(1 ) .
(1 ) (1 )
cdY dm Z
Y m Y
H mdR Zdm dR
m Y m Y
= −ξ +
−
  −− ′+η − − − 
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m Y
= −ξ σ +
−
η − η −′+
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亅
     
(10)
where Y denotes the aggregate income, Z 
is the declared income, R is the concealed 
income, ξc and ξu are the compensated 
and uncompensated elasticity of income 
relative to the net-of-tax rate (1 – m), re-
spectively, the income effect parameter 
η represents the change in after-tax GDP 
caused by the change in hidden income, 
(dR – Zdm) is the change in after-tax in-
come due to the tax change for a given be-
fore declared income Z, which means that 
delinquent taxpayers may not honestly 
declare the whole amounts of their eva-
ded tax. Let taxpayer’s declared income 
be taxed at the marginal tax rate m. Thus, 
it can be expressed as (some example see 
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The biggest discrepancy between this 
paper and the current literature is that 
the coefficient ξc and coefficient η can be 
derived through SUR-OLS regression di-
rectly, where ξc denotes the compensated 
elasticity of taxable income coefficient, η is 
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the income effects coefficient. Considering 
the costs of evasion are real resource costs 
and not just transfers (Chetty [49]; Bala-
foutas et al. [50]), variable H represents 
the hidden cost of tax evasion, H Y′  is the 
marginal cost of “hidden cost”, mt is the 
average income tax rate applicable to the 
taxpayers (some example see Wang et al. 








− ∂ ξ =   ∂ − 



























 − ′+η − + ε −        
(12)
 
Furthermore, Eq. (12) can be analyzed 
as follows: 
(a) Suppose the hidden cost of tax eva-
sion for the tax evaders is ignored, which 
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(13)
(b) Consider the tax evaders’ s hidden 
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In fact, concerning the change of tax 
policy is likely to affect the income elas-
ticity of income tax (see Creedy & Gem-
mell [32]), for example, Singer [52] uses 
dummy variables in estimating the in-
come elasticity of state income-tax reve-
nues. In this paper, we take the impact 
of two dummy variables D1994, D2012t into 
consideration, where D1994 is dummy va- 
riable that equals 1 after 1994, denoting 
the reform of China’s tax sharing system, 
and D2012 is dummy variable that equals 
1 after 2012, depicting the implementa-
tion of replacing business tax with value- 
added tax since 2012. However, as is 
known, because the regression analysis of 
more than two dummy variables are in-
clined to appear “dummy variable trap” 
and linear combination of dummy vari-
ables, the intercept term of one dummy 
variable can be omitted to avoid singu-
lar phenomenon (Kennedy [53]). So that 
Eq. (13) is represented as follows:
4 1994 5 2012




dY dm Z dR Zdm
Y m Y m Y
H dR D D
Y
 −= −ξ + η − − − 
′− + β + β + ε
 
(15)
where εt = φ1εt – 1 + φ2εt – 2 + σt.
As shown in Eq. (15), instead of cal-
culating ETI directly, Eq. (15) obtains an 
average elasticity through regressions ex-
plicitly.
Obviously, in comparing with exis-ting 
relevant literature on underground econo-
my, our result has the advantage of allowing 
simple tests of significance of the estimated 
average elasticities as well as the option of 
including relative explanatory variables. On 
the other hand, it has the advantage of being 
applicable to countries and applications in 
time series analysis. In this section, we de-
monstrate, at the aggregate income level, 
how the revenue elasticity and the elasticity 
of taxable income are combined to generate 
the elasticity of tax with respect to the mar-
ginal rate. Furthermore, considering the joint 
role of the elasticity of taxable income (the 
effect on taxable income of a tax rise) and the 
revenue elasticity (the effect on revenue of 
a change in taxable income) in influencing 
the aggregate income and revenue effects of 
tax rate changes. Clearly, an appealing fea-
ture of this article is that, in the traditional 
literature, when calculating the value of the 
two coefficients, ξc and η, the statistical data 
must be brought into ξc and η to seize the 
results. However, instead of calculating, in 
this paper, we use the SUR-OLS regression 
approach and Slutsky identity directly ob-
tain the coefficient values of the time serial 
composite structures model. Namely, this 
is the main discrepancy between our article 
and current relative literature.
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5. Empirical Research results
5.1. Methodology
As is well known, there are a number 
of ways to measure aggregate income, but 
GDP is one of the best known and most 
widely used.To explore the impact of Chi-
na’s underground economy and tax ar-
rears on GDP, our estimates are from offi-
cial statistics complied annually by China 
National Bureau of Statistics since 1991. It 
is well known, the basic hypothesis, inter-
cept term, regression coefficient and error 
term of the model will vary with various 
assumptions In this paper, we assume that 
all independent variable coefficients (in-
cluding intercept and slope) are different 
due to different tax rates and tax policies, 
but the error term dependent. Although 
traditional regression analysis assumes 
that the residual items are independent of 
each other, in fact it may be dependent. In 
fact, the overall environment faced by tax-
payers in all regions of China is roughly 
the same. Except for various explanatory 
variables, other factors not included in the 
regression model may have the same im-
pact on taxpayers in all regions. 
Therefore, in this case, seemingly un-
related regression (SUR-OLS) can be used 
for analysis (see Zellner [35], Griffiths et al. 
[36]). As mentioned above, even though 
China has a vast territory, but the trans-
portation in China is very convenient. 
Taxpayers are in the same environment 
of tax laws and regulations, which affects 
the environment of taxpayers’ income 
declaration and tax arrears. Therefore, the 
residual items are not independent but re-
lated. In view of this, in order to reduce 
the standard error, this paper uses “seem-
ingly unrelated regression” (SUR-OLS) 
to test and analyze . In order to explore 
the influence of underground economy 
and tax rate on GDP growth, firstly, GDP 
is defined as “explained variable”. The 
explanatory variables include: the ratio 
of declared income to actual income, the 
change of concealed income, and the in-
fluence of tax rate change on declared in-
come and concealed income. According to 
the tax reform in 1994 and 2012, two dum-
my variables are set respectively.
5.2. Unit Root Test
Next we use Simultaneous equations 
model and SUR-OLS approach to exploit 
China as a case study, using the cointegra-
tion approach among the GDP, variab-
les Z, R, m for China over a time period 
ranging from 1991 to 2019, determining 
whether the stochastic component con-
tains a unit root or not. 
The results of unit root tests are pre-
sented in Table 1, which demonstrates that 
all the variables appeared stationary at the 
first – differenced form under 5% significant 
level, depicting the logged variables are I(1). 
We next utilize the SUR-OLS regression 
method evaluating the residual term and es-
timate whether the residual term conforms 
to no sequence autocorrelation. 
Owing to the Q-statistic proposed by 
Box and Pierce (1970) is rather weak in 
large samples, Ljung-Box [54] proposes 
another modified Q-statistic suitable for 
small samples. However, Box & Jenkins 
[55] consider that it is necessary to diag-
nose whether the parameters have over-
fitting and also confirm whether the re-
siduals have serial correlation. Below, the 
results of Ljung-Box Q test are shown in 
Figure 1, which reveals the probability 
values of Q-statistics from the first period 
Table 1
Performance of unit root test 1991–2019
Variable N-st difference (C, T, K) DW ADF 5% 1% Result
Y 1 (C, n, 8) 1.54 –4.04 –3.67 –4.53 I(1)**
Z 1 (C, n, 6) 2.04 –4.22 –3.61 –4.39 I(1)**
R 1 (C, n, 5) 1.83 –6.05 –3.67 –4.53 I(1)***
m 1 (C, n, 1) 1.87 –5.20 –3.59 –4.35 I(1)***
Note: (C, T, K) indicates whether the test formula contains constant term, time trend and number 
of lag periods using AIC. Standard errors in parentheses: *** means the first-order difference passes the 
stability test at 1% significance level, ** means the first-order difference passes the stability test at 5% 
significance level. 
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Sample: 1991 2019
Included observations: 13
Q-statistic probabilities adjusted for 2 dynamic regressors
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC  PAC  Q-Sta...  Prob...
1 0.333 0.333 1.7991 0.180
2 -0.03... -0.16... 1.8188 0.403
3 -0.22... -0.18... 2.8223 0.420
4 -0.22... -0.10... 3.9421 0.414
5 -0.30... -0.26... 6.2272 0.285
6 -0.10... 0.016 6.5058 0.369
7 -0.10... -0.22... 6.8637 0.443
8 -0.14... -0.26... 7.7184 0.461
9 0.011 -0.00... 7.7245 0.562
1... 0.200 -0.00... 10.316 0.413
1... 0.150 -0.08... 12.516 0.326
1... 0.170 0.056 18.182 0.110
*Probabilities may not be valid for this equation specification.
Sample: 1991 2019
Included observations: 13
Q-statistic probabilities adjusted for 2 dynamic regressors
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC  PAC  Q-Sta...  Prob...
1 -0.01... -0.01... 0.0021 0.964
2 0.137 0.137 0.3371 0.845
3 -0.17... -0.17... 0.9133 0.822
4 0.117 0.104 1.2117 0.876
5 -0.49... -0.47... 7.0829 0.215
6 0.068 0.084 7.2105 0.302
7 -0.24... -0.19... 9.1393 0.243
8 -0.05... -0.23... 9.2474 0.322
9 -0.09... 0.101 9.6793 0.377
1... 0.220 -0.13... 12.835 0.233
1... -0.13... -0.10... 14.518 0.206
1... 0.105 -0.06... 16.670 0.162




Q-statistic probabilities adjusted for 2 dynamic regressors
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC  PAC  Q-Sta...  Prob...
1 0.352 0.352 2.0159 0.156
2 0.005 -0.13... 2.0165 0.365
3 -0.26... -0.25... 3.3550 0.340
4 -0.28... -0.12... 5.1293 0.274
5 -0.29... -0.20... 7.2114 0.205
6 -0.12... -0.05... 7.6394 0.266
7 -0.04... -0.11... 7.6966 0.360
8 -0.10... -0.28... 8.1331 0.421
9 -0.03... -0.10... 8.1929 0.515
1... 0.244 0.195 12.075 0.280
1... 0.119 -0.22... 13.453 0.265
1... 0.180 0.109 19.763 0.072
*Probabilities may not be valid for this equation specification.
Sample: 1991 2019
Included observations: 13
Q-statistic probabilities adjusted for 2 dynamic regressors
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC  PAC  Q-Sta...  Prob...
1 -0.06... -0.06... 0.0621 0.803
2 0.163 0.160 0.5320 0.766
3 -0.22... -0.21... 1.5462 0.672
4 0.153 0.120 2.0531 0.726
5 -0.45... -0.42... 7.0782 0.215
6 0.058 -0.00... 7.1709 0.305
7 -0.25... -0.15... 9.2708 0.234
8 -0.06... -0.31... 9.4391 0.307
9 -0.07... 0.097 9.7313 0.373
1... 0.315 0.073 16.172 0.095
1... -0.08... -0.15... 16.888 0.111
1... 0.101 -0.01... 18.870 0.092




Q-statistic probabilities adjusted for 2 dynamic regressors
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC  PAC  Q-Sta...  Prob...
1 0.376 0.376 2.3016 0.129
2 -0.01... -0.18... 2.3074 0.315
3 -0.27... -0.23... 3.7509 0.290
4 -0.29... -0.12... 5.6220 0.229
5 -0.22... -0.12... 6.8719 0.230
6 -0.13... -0.12... 7.3727 0.288
7 -0.02... -0.07... 7.3939 0.389
8 -0.08... -0.23... 7.6600 0.467
9 -0.01... -0.05... 7.6664 0.568
1... 0.178 0.120 9.7144 0.466
1... 0.099 -0.17... 10.675 0.471
1... 0.149 0.107 14.979 0.243
*Probabilities may not be valid for this equation specification.
Sample: 1991 2019
Included observations: 13
Q-statistic probabilities adjusted for 2 dynamic regressors
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC  PAC  Q-Sta...  Prob...
1 -0.17... -0.17... 0.4922 0.483
2 0.200 0.175 1.2005 0.549
3 -0.31... -0.26... 3.0738 0.380
4 0.129 0.028 3.4317 0.488
5 -0.31... -0.23... 5.8501 0.321
6 0.011 -0.16... 5.8534 0.440
7 -0.19... -0.13... 7.0476 0.424
8 -0.05... -0.28... 7.1468 0.521
9 -0.03... -0.10... 7.2103 0.615
1... 0.355 0.269 15.421 0.117
1... 0.014 -0.02... 15.441 0.163
1... 0.072 -0.08... 16.459 0.171




Q-statistic probabilities adjusted for 2 dynamic regressors
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC  PAC  Q-Sta...  Prob...
1 0.098 0.098 0.1549 0.694
2 -0.01... -0.02... 0.1571 0.924
3 -0.15... -0.15... 0.6338 0.889
4 -0.03... -0.00... 0.6600 0.956
5 -0.23... -0.24... 2.0017 0.849
6 -0.16... -0.15... 2.7355 0.841
7 -0.15... -0.16... 3.5123 0.834
8 -0.04... -0.13... 3.6012 0.891
9 0.091 0.019 4.0086 0.911
1... 0.009 -0.14... 4.0141 0.947
1... 0.136 0.036 5.8301 0.884
1... 0.209 0.130 14.320 0.281
*Probabilities may not be valid for this equation specification.
Sample: 1991 2019
Included observations: 13
Q-statistic probabilities adjusted for 2 dynamic regressors
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC  PAC  Q-Sta...  Prob...
1 -0.00... -0.00... 0.0006 0.981
2 0.127 0.127 0.2859 0.867
3 -0.19... -0.19... 0.9881 0.804
4 0.082 0.072 1.1327 0.889
5 -0.45... -0.43... 6.0774 0.299
6 0.065 0.066 6.1956 0.402
7 -0.24... -0.20... 8.2016 0.315
8 -0.01... -0.18... 8.2109 0.413
9 -0.07... 0.038 8.5152 0.483
1... 0.138 -0.18... 9.7493 0.463
1... -0.10... -0.07... 10.818 0.459
1... 0.132 -0.08... 14.207 0.288
*Probabilities may not be valid for this equation specification.
 (g) (h)
Fig. 1. Performance of residual autocorrelation diagnosis, 1991–2019
Note: 1. (a) to (h) in Fig. 1 correspond to the model 1 to model 8 in Table 2 . 2. p-value from (a) to (h) 
are all significantly greater than the 5% significance level, which reveals the residuals estimates of model 
1 to model 8 have no sequence autocorrelation.
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to the twelfth period are all significantly 
greater than the 5% significance level. On 
the other words, the residuals estimates of 
model 1 to model 8 have no sequence au-
tocorrelation.
We next exploit the Histogram-Nor-
mality test and Heteroscedasticity test. 
In Table 2, we use Breusch-Pagan-God-
frey to diagnose residual heterogeneity, 
which show the p-values of F-statistic, 
OBS * R-squared and Scaled explained SS 
of all models are all significantly greater 
than 5%, denoting that the residuals from 
model 1 to model 8, in Table 2, do not exist 
residual heterogeneity. 
5.3. Correlation coefficient analysis
In order to avoid the problem of col-
linearity among explanatory variables, 
which will affect the empirical results, this 
paper intends to test the correlation de-
gree of each explanatory variable before 
the empirical study. From the Pearson 
correlation coefficient analysis results in 










are negatively correlated with variable 
Dummy1994 at − 0.781 and − 0.601, re-
spectively. 
The correlation coefficients of other 
explanatory variables ranged from −0.056 
to 0.558, which means that the correlation 
coefficients of independent variables are 
not high, and the problem of regression 
collinearity is not serious, among which 
the tax system reform in 1994 and 2012 are 
discussed by using the dummy variables. 
In Table 4, we show that from model 
1 to model 8, the p-values of Jarque-Bera 
Table 2
























































Note: 1.In this table, the p-values of F-statistic, OBS * R-squared and Scaled explained SS of model 
1 to model 8 are significantly greater than 5%. 2. In this Table, model 1 to model 8 correspond to the 
eight models in Table 4 in an orderly way. 3. Standard errors in parentheses: *** means the first-order 
difference passes the stability test at 1% significance level, ** means the first-order difference passes the 
stability test at 5% significance level. 
Table 3
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Dummy 1994 1 0.192(0.319)
Dummy 2012 1
Note: The upper right corner of this table is the Pearson correlation coefficient (p-value in brackets).
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test are greater than 5%, depicting that all 
models in Table 4 can not reject the null 
hypothesis that the residual term con-
forms to normal distribution. This above 
mentioned research design demonstrates, 
at the aggregate income level, how the 
revenue elasticity and the elasticity of 
taxable income are combined to genera-
te the elasticity of tax with respect to the 
change of marginal rate. Next, on the basis 
of the the joint elasticity of taxable revenue 
(JETR), three indicators ( the cash deposit 
ratio (CDR) approach, currency demand 
(CD) approach and currency transaction 
(CT)) are added separately to evaluate the 
relationships among elasticities, under-
ground economy(UE) and GDP growth. 
For controlling the contemporaneous cor-
relation between the heterogeneity and 
the residual in the models, we use SUR-
OLS and Rolle’s approach to evaluate the 
interdependence and correlation between 
those parameters. 
In model 1 of Table 4, we only ana-












on GDP growth. As noted in Table 4, 
D1994 is dummy variable that equals 1 af-
ter 1994, denoting the reform of China’s 
tax sharing system, and D2012 is dummy 
variable that equals 1 after 2012, depic- 
ting the implementation of replacing 
business tax with value-added tax since 
2012. Due to the regression analysis of 
more than two dummy variables are in-
clined to appear “dummy variable trap” 
and linear combination of dummy va-
riables, the intercept term of one dummy 
variable can be omitted to avoid singular 
phenomenon [53]. To show how these 
two important tax reforms influence the 
GDP growth over time, in model 2 of Ta-
ble 4, the dummy variables D1994 and D2012 
are added concurrently. 
5.4. GMM test
The Sargan-Hansen test (Sargan [56]; 
Hansen [57]) is computed from residuals 
from instrumental variables regression 
by constructing a quadratic form based 
on the cross-product of the residuals and 
exogenous variables. Under the null hy-
pothesis that the over-identifying restric-
tions are valid. In Table 4, we use Sargan-
Hansen test to prove the post estimation of 
GMM (generalized method of moments), 
the null hypothesis shows that the instru-
mental variable is effective. 
According to the estimation results, 
the p-values of model 1–8 are all less than 
0.05. 
Therefore, we agree with the null hy-
pothesis of “instrumental variables are ef-
fective” in Eq. (16) regression model.
5.5. Regression analysis and results
Eq. (15) displays the behavioral re-
sponse in income induced by the small tax 
change and tax reform. However, for large 
tax changes, it is perhaps more suitable to 
use a log–log specification. Hence, exclu-
































= −ξ + − 






+ β +β + ε  
(16)
where εt = φ1εt – 1 + φ2εt – 2 + σt.
Further, we incorporate three kinds 
of underground economic parameters 
respectively, including logGutmann_UE, 
logTanzi_UE and logFeige_UE, into 
Eq. (16) in pursuit of measuring their in-
fluence on GDP growth. For the under-
ground economy parameter, it can be 
seen that research conducted by Tanzi 
[58] calculates only those underground 
activities that are solely the result of ta- 
xes. That is to say, in general, the esti-
mates are obviously higher for the Gut-
mann approach than for the Tanzi ap-
proach (see Cebula & Feige [48]). Based 
on the empirical results in Table 4, we 
draw the following results:
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Case 1: Model 1 in Table 4 indicates 




has a negative correlation with dY Y , and 
its coefficient value ξc is –0.442, reaching 
1% significance. 
It means that the increase of tax rate 
will lead to the decrease of taxpayer’s 
income and willingness to declare. Like-






has a negative correlation with dY Y, and 
its coefficient value η is –0.139616, which 
means that the increase of tax rate leads to 
the increase of concealed income, which 
eventually leads to the decrease of GDP, but 
it does not pass the 10% significance test.
Case 2: We add two dummy variables 
D1994 and D2012 into model 1 in Table 4, and 
get model 2 in Table 4. The result shows 
that ξc is –0.28407, which passes the signifi-
cance test of 1%. It means that the increase 
of tax rate will lead to the decrease of tax-
payer’s income. The coefficient η is –0.0275, 
it means that the increase of tax rate leads 
to the increase of concealed income, which 
eventually leads to the decrease of GDP, 
but it fails to pass the 10% significance test. 
This shows that the increase of tax rate 
leads to the prevalence of underground 
economy, but the income holders of un-
derground economy may eventually drive 
part of GDP growth through consumption 
expenditure, which can be regarded as par-
tially offsetting the strength of the above 
ground economic slowdown (see Schnei-
der & Enste [18]). In addition, two dummy 
variables D1994 and D2012 are added to model 
1 in Table 4, Model 2 in Table 4 can be ob-
tained, and the corresponding regression 
coefficient is positive, which has passed the 
significance test of 1%. It shows that the im-
pact of the two tax reform on GDP is posi-
tively correlated.














to model 1 of Table 4 From the results of 
model 3 in Table 4, we can see that the 
variable Gutmann_UE is negatively cor-
related with GDP, reaching a significant 
level of 1%.
The test of the cash deposit ratio 
(CDR) method shows that the higher the 
proportion of currency to current de-
posit, the more underground economic 
activities, leading to the decline of GDP. 
Likewise, Model 4 in Table 4 shows that 
the two dummy variables, D1994 and D2012 
both have a positive effect on GDP , which 
pass the 10% and 5% significant test, re-
spectively. Meanwhile, Model 3 in Table 4 
is based on model 1, adding the variable 





has a negative correlation with dY Y , and 
its coefficient value ξc is –0.2430, reaching 
1% significance. It means that the increase 
of tax rate will lead to the decrease of tax-
payer’s income and willingness to declare. 






has a negative correlation with dY Y , and 
its coefficient value η is –0.2075, reaching 
5% significance, it means that the increase 
of tax rate leads to the increase of con-
cealed income, which eventually leads to 
the decrease of GDP. 
Based on Model 3 in Table 4, two 
dummy variables are added to form Mo-







has a negative correlation with dY Y , and 
its coefficient value η is –0.2248, reaching 
1% significance, it means that the increase 
of tax rate leads to the increase of con-
cealed income, which eventually leads to 
the decrease of GDP. The coefficient η is 
–0.1051, which fails to pass the 10% signi-
ficance test. Similar to the result of case 2, 
this shows that the increase of tax rate 
leads to the prevalence of underground 
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economy may eventually pull part of GDP 
growth through consumption expendi-
ture, partially offsetting the above ground 
economic recession.
Case 4: Model 5 in Table 4 is based on 







C D C+ −
and the corresponding regression coeffi-
cient is –0.234, indicating that the effect of 
the variable Tanzi_UE on GDP is negative, 
but it fails the 10% significance test. The 
analysis results of model 5 in Table 4 can 
be explained by Becker’s crime and pe- 
nalty theory [58], the cost of using 
cash seems to be less than that of elec-
tronic payment, so the increase of 
using electronic payment may not neces-
sarily lead to the decrease of cash use. Our 
empirical result is similar to the research 
by Visa Europe et al. (2013), illustrating 
the anonymity of cash makes it difficult 
to trace cash transactions, resulting in 
the prevalence of underground econo-
my. Nevertheless, we add two dummy 
variables to model 1 of Table 4 to obtain 
model 6 of Table 4. The results show that 
two dummy variables D1994 and D2012, both 
of them have a positive impact on GDP, 
reaching 10% and 5% respectively. Mean-
while, Model 5 in Table 4 is based on 
Model 1, adding the variable Tanzi_UE, 






has a negative correlation with dY Y , and 
its coefficient value ξc is –0.4263, reaching 
1% significance. The empirical result is 
the same as that of case 1 to case 3, which 
means that the increase of tax rate leads 
to the increase of concealed income, which 
eventually leads to the decrease of GDP.












into Model 1 in Table 4, and get Model 7 
in Table 4. The corresponding regression 
coefficient is –0.741, which shows that the 
influence of variable Feige_UE on GDP is 
negative, reaching the significance level 
of 1%. Even if we include the two dum-
my variables, D1994 and D2012 into Model 8 
in Table 4. The results show that the im-
pact of Feige_UE on GDP is negative and 
reaches the significance level of 5%. Ob-
viously, the above empirical results are 
consistent with Farrell’s (2004), that is, 
tax evasion will lead to a decline in GDP. 
Likewise, Model 7 and Model 8 in Table 4 






has a negative correlation with dY Y , 
and its coefficient value ξc is –0.2450 and 
–0.2499, respectively, reaching 1% signifi-
cance. 
The result of our analysis confirming 
the increase of tax rate leads to the in-
crease of concealed income, which even-
tually leads to the decrease of GDP.
5.6. Summary
Further, based on the results of em-
pirical analysis, the above research results 
can be further summarized, with the fol-
lowing key points: 
1) Using Tanzi_UE [59] approach, the 
impact of cash transactions on GDP is 
negatively correlated, implying that the 
increase in cash transactions led to an in-
crease in the underground economy. Our 
findings are consistent with Cagan’s [10] 
view that cash is the main medium for 
people to engage in underground eco-
nomic activities.In underground econo-
mic activities, cash transactions can avoid 
being recorded and tracked by monetary 
authorities (see Gutmann [12], Tanzi [60]). 
As is well known, in recent years, electro-
nic payment transaction has been widely 
used to replace traditional cash payment 
in China. In this paper, we find that the 
use of cash in the market is negatively cor-
related with GDP, but this relationship 
does not pass the 10% significance test. 
The empirical results of this paper are con-
sistent with Schneider and Enste [18]. The 
increase of tax rate leads to the prevalence 
of underground economy, but some of the 
income from underground economy may 
eventually flow into the consumption 
market to drive the growth of GDP. 
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2) All models in Table 4 show that ξc 
is negatively correlated with GDP and 
pass the 1% significance test. Obviously, 
this proves that Slutsky compensation 
price elasticity (including income effect 
and substitution effect) is negative, that 
is, an increase in the marginal tax rate will 
lead to a decrease in taxpayers’ declared 
income. This article further derives the re-
lationship between uncompensated price 
elasticity, ξc = ξu – η and GDP, and the two 
also show a negative correlation, as shown 
in Table 5. It can be found that, generally 
speaking, the fluctuation range of tax rate 
is smaller than that of commodity price, so 
the coefficient difference between ξc and ξu 
is not obvious. However, since ξu includes 
the income effect, the “income” is normal 
goods rather than inferior goods, so ξu > ξc. 
3) In Table 4, almost all models re-
veal two dummy variables, D1994 and D2012, 
which are positively correlated with GDP 
and pass the significance test of 10%. Ob-
viously, our results are consistent with 
those of Fugazza and Jacques [61], who 
believe that higher tax rates and govern-
ment regulation are the key factors affec-
ting the underground economy.
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we exploit GDP (aggre-
gate income), tax elasticity, income elasti-
city, three kinds of underground economic 
estimation models, as well as two impor-
tant tax reform in China in 1994 and 2012 
as independent variables, and examined 
the revenue responsiveness properties of 
China taxation and underground econo-
my since 1991–2019 using Slutsky identity 
and SUR-OLSs method for GDP growth.
Taking China as an example, this 
paper selects tax rate elasticity, income 
elasticity, three kinds of underground 
economic estimation models and two im-
portant tax system reforms in 1994 and 
2012 as independent variables. In metho-
dology, this paper uses SUR-OLSs and 
Slutsky identity to estimate the impact of 
underground economy on GDP growth 
since 1991–2019. As is well known, SUR-
OLS estimator achieves asymptotic effi-
ciency gains over OLS by incorporating 
the long-run cross sectional correlation 
in the equilibrium errors in estimation. In 
comparison with traditional literature, the 
merit of our model is that we directly use 
SUR-OLS regression analysis to calculate 
variables, in contrast with current articles, 
our model does not need to be substituted 
into the data for complex calculation. On 
the other hand, in our paper, the Slutsky 
compensated elasticity coefficient, ξc, and 
the income effects coefficient, η, can be 
obtained directly through our SUR-OLS 
model. 
Undoubtedly, by comparing with other 
relevant literature on this issue, our pa-
per has the above merits, our innovative 
methodology can also be applied to most 
countries for time series analyses. Also, 
based on the joint elasticity of taxable in-
come (JETR), in empirical analysis, we 
decompose tax changes into tax rate effect 
(change of budget constraint slope) and 
income effect (change of tax liability), and 
further analyze the impact of tax elasti-
city (ETI) on GDP growth. That is, in Mo-
del 1–8 of Table 4, the relationship between 
explanatory variable “tax rate” and “in-
come” of explained variable is analyzed 
Table 5
Slutsky identity estimation from SUR-OLS 







− ∂ ξ =   ∂ − 










∂ −  
–0.582 –0.3115 –0.4505 –0.3299 –0.5803 –0.3163 –0.2572 –0.2775
Note: Table 5 is the result derived from formula (8) based on Table 4.
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by SUR-OLS and Slutsky identity, and the 
substitution effect is negative, reaching a 
significant level of 1%, which means that 
when taxpayers face the increase of tax 
rate, the relative price of declared income 
and concealed income changes. 
At this time, the budget line will 
move inward, leading to the decrease of 
declared income. Refering to Tanzi’s un-
derground economy approach, we show 
the increment in cash transactions at the 
market led to a decline in China’s GDP, 
however, it is worth noting that the result 
is still not obvious, revealing the incre-
ment of cash transactions in market does 
not necessarily result in a decline in GDP 
growth. Our results are similar to those of 
Schneider and Enste. The increase of tax 
rate leads to the increase of underground 
economy and the decrease of GDP. Ho-
wever, the income holders of the under-
ground economy will eventually show 
their hidden income through consump-
tion expenditure, which will partly slow 
down the decline of GDP. 
Also, we show that China implemen-
ted the reform of the tax sharing system 
in 1994, and the fiscal distribution was 
dominated by the central government. 
From 1993 to 1995, the total tax revenue 
was 425.5 billion yuan, 512.6 billion yuan 
and 603.8 billion yuan, respectively. Since 
then, the total tax revenue has been in-
creasing year by year. In addition, the 
implementation of “replacing business tax 
with value-added tax” started in 2012 to 
avoid double taxation. According to Chi-
na’s statistical data, the total business tax 
and value-added tax from 2012 to 2015 are 
4261.2 billion yuan, 4604.3 billion yuan, 
4863.6 billion yuan and 5042.1 billion 
yuan, respectively; due to the business tax 
in 2016 has been cancelled, the value-ad-
ded tax from 2016 to 2019 is 5221.3 billion 
yuan, 5637.8 billion yuan, 6153.3 billion 
yuan and 6234.6 billion yuan respectively, 
showing an upward trend year by year. 
In addition, it is particularly impres-
sive that China implemented two impor-
tant and representative tax reforms in 
1994 and 2012 respectively, denoting the 
reform of China’s tax sharing system since 
1994, and the implementation of replacing 
business tax with value-added tax since 
2012, the empirical results show that both 
the 1994 tax reform and 2012 tax reform 
have a positive impact on GDP, with high 
statistical significance respectively. It may 
be of interest that in line with Chen et al. 
(2020), our empirical results demonstrate 
that China’s underground economy has 
significantly slowed down during 1991–
2019. Finally, since the hidden cost can not 
be quantified and presented with specific 
data, thus it is not included in the research 
scope. It is expected that the follow-up 
researchers can adopt different research 
methods continuing to explore and re-
search, so as to provide tax collection 
agencies with more contributions in clea- 
ring up the underground economic ar-
rears.
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